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PREFACE.
It has been my aim in preparing this work to supple-
ment a paper presented in 1893 upon The Inter-State Com-
merce Commission, discussed from an economic standpoint.
But in doing this I have been compelled, by lack of time,
to confine myself to a very limited field, viz., the
first five sections of the act which gave rise to the Com-
mission, and which I have termed the "Discriminating
Clauses".
It will be observed that I have dealt almost exclu-
sively with Federal decisions. This has seemed wise to
me because the decisions of the Commission are not final,
and also because matters of importance are not settled un-
til they ultimately have found their way to the Federal
Courts.
J.B.T.
Ithaca, N. Y., April 10, 1895.
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CHAPTER I.
I N T R 0 D U C T I 0 N.
During the past fifty years the development of railwaw
all over the world has been so marked as to characterize
the age as one of railway building, but nowhere has it
been so phenomenal as in the United States. The rail-
way system of the United States has been the marvel of
the world. Its expansion has been so rapid and unexpect-
ed that it has been impossible during the progress of its
wonderful development to determine, with exactness, or to
regulate, with careful consideration, its proper relation
to the citizen or to governmental authority. That abuses
are bound to arise in any industry of this character, seeum
inevitable. The signs of discontent produced by these
inevitable abuses have been manifesting themselves for no
short length of time. For more than twenty years this
feeling of discontent has been shaping itself into a defi-
nite movement. But the conditions and circumstances that
6nivironed the early development of the railway system of
the United States were such that it is easy to understand why
no comprehensive and uniform plan of regulation was
then thought of or developed. The great and absorbing
2problem was not how to regulate railways, but rather how
to get them.
With this stimulus railways have been brought near
our government in many ways. Their very existence is
the result of permission granted by our government. Yet
the Federal authority has gone even further. Not always
have the prospects of large returns from the risk incurred
and the capital invested been sufficient to induce
capital into railway construction, so, in many cases,
our government has lent a helping hand to these timid
monopolies. Two hundred millions acres, at least, of
our public lands have been given to the great western
trunk lines as a sort of subsidy to stimulate railway
building.
However, during these years of marvellous development
the lines of public opinion have been drawn tighter and
tighter on railways on account of the multitude and mag-
nitude of abuses perpetrated by them. The people keep
demanding governmental control as they are so apt to do
in Democracies where abuses are practiced. That there
was cause for complaint,there cannot be the slightest
doubt, even though the means taken to correct it were
severely criticised by many.
The whole movement for reform is contrary to the
Laissez-faire school of economic thinkers and also the
3Ricardian Doctrine, which are based upon the assumption
that when earnings fall below cost of service, active
competition would then cease. "This fails" says Profes-
sor Hadley, "because far below the point where it pays to
do your own business, it pays to steal business from an-
other man". Ricardo's theory worked well when applied
to mercantile competition but fell hopelessly when ap-
plied to railroads. (Hadley's Railroad Transportation.)
The subject of railway legislation had been much dis -
cussed in Congress prior to March, 1885,when the Senate
passed a resolution appointing a select committee of
five senators whose duty it was to investigate and report
upon the matter of the regulation of transportation.
They were to report on or before the second Monday of the
following December. The committee was composed of the
following senators : Collin, of Illinois ; Miller, of
New York ; Platt, of Connecticut ; Goram, of Maryland
and Harris, of Tennessee. From March, 1885,until Janu-
ary, 1886, when they submitted their report, they were
engaged in collecting testimony all over the United States
The testimony taken, with statements in response to cor-
respondents, were reported in a volume containing more
than 1450 pages. The book represents the best thought
of the American people on the subject of transportation
at that time.
The committee summed up the charges which were in-
directly formulated in the statements and testimony as
follows :-
1. Local rates are unreasonably high when compared
with through rates.
2. Both local and through rates are unreasonably hig
at non-competing points, either from absence of com-
petition or in consequence of pooling agreements which
restrict its operation.
3. Rates are established apparently without re-
gard to actual cost of service performed, and are based
largely upon what the traffic will bear.
4. Unjustifiable discriminations are constantly made
between individuals in the rates charged for like services
under similar circumstances.
5. Improper discriminations are made between articla
of freight and branches of business of a like character
and between differ-nt qualities of the same class of
freight.
6. Unreasonable discriminations are made between
localities similarly situated.
7. The effect of the prevailing policy of railway
management is, by an elaborate system of secret special
rates, rebates, drawbacks, and concessions, to foster
monopolies, to enrich favored shippers, and to prevent
free competition in many lines of trade in which the item
of transportation is an important factor.
58. Such favoritism and secrecy induce an element of
uncertainty into legitimate business that greatly retards
the development of our commerce and industries.
9. The secret cutting of rates and the sudden fluctt-
tions that constantly take place are demoralizing to all
business except those of a speculative character, and
frequently occasion great injustice and heavy loss.
10. In the absence of national and uniform legisla-
tion they are able by various devices to evade their re-
sponsibility as carriers, especially on shipments over
more than one road or from one state to another, and
shippers find great difficulty in recovering damages for
losses of property or for injury thereto.
11. The railroads refuse to be bound by their con-
tracts and arbitrarily collect large sums in the shape of
overcharges in addition to the rates agreed upon at the
time of shipment.
12. Railroads often refuse to recognize or be respon-
sible for the acts of dishonest agents acting under their
authority.
13. The common law fails to afford a remedy for such
grievances and, in case of disputes the shipper is com-
pelled to submit to the decision of the railroad manager
or pool commissioner, or to run the risk of incurring
further losses by greater discriminations.
14. Differences in classification in use in various
6parts of the country, and sometimes for shipments over the
sae road in different directions, are a fruitful source
of misunderstanding, and are often made a means of
extortion.
15. A privileged class is created by the granting of
passes, and that the cost of passenger service is largely
increased by the extent of this abuse.
16. The capitalization and bonded indebtedness of
the roads largely exceed the actual cost of their con-
struction or their present value, and that unreasonable
rates are charged in the effort to pay dividends on
watered stock and interest on bonds improperly issued.
17. Railroad corporations have improperly engaged in
business entirely distinct from that of transportation,
and that undue advantages have been offered to business
enterprises in which railroad officials are interested.
18. The management of railroad business is extra-
vagant and wasteful, and that a needless tax is imposed
upon the shipping and traveling public by the unnecessary
expenditure of large sums in the maintenance of a costly
force of agents employed in reckless strife for competitie
business. (A. B. Stickney, The Railroad Problem. The
Forum, Vol. XI. The American Economic Association, Vol. ]I
Annual Reports of the Inter-State Commerce Commission,
Vol. I.)
It will be observed that the most important, and in
7fact nearly all of the foregoing complaints are based upon
the practice of discrimination in one form or another. It
is these complaints that have given rise to the discrim-
inating clauses of the Inter-State Commerce Act, which it
is the province of this paper to discuss.
CHAPTER II.
Tiff, TNTER-STATE COTMERCE ACT.
On the basis of the report mentioned in Chapter I, t}e
the Senate proposed a bill as a solution of the difficulty,
but, as is not unusual, the House objected. The more
numerous branch of the national legislature wished the
bill to contain more inflexible rales. As a result, all
legislation was at a standstill on account of the dead-
lock which this bill produced between the two houses. As
the close of the session was drawing near, a conference
committee was appointed to work a solution of the diffi-
culties which for some time had rendered the houses of
the national legislature hostile camps, making legisla-
tion of any kind impossible. The Senate bill was final-
ly patched-up by adding, among other things, the import-
ant matter, the short-haul and the anti-pooling clauses
both of which will be treated in detail in later Chapters.
The bill was known as "An Act to Regulate Commerce", but
more commonly known as " The Inter-State Commerce Act".
It passed the Senate February 4, 1887, by a vote of 43
to 15 and passed the House by a vote of 191 to 32, going
into effect in April ,of the same year, and is found in
24 U.S.Stat. at large at pp. 379-87. In 1889 the origin-
al act was amended by modifying some of the original
24 sections, but as none of the amendments in any way af-
fect the first five sections, which are the subject of
this paper, it will be unnecessary to do more than men-
t~on that certain sections of the original act were modi-
fied in 1889. These amendments may be found in 25 U.S.
Stat. at Large at pp. 855-63.
The first five sections, or as they will be termed
in this paper, "The Discriminating Clauses of the Inter-
State Commerce Act", are as follows
Enacting clause.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives of the United States of America in Congress as-
sembled, That the provisions of this act shall apply to
any common carrier or carriers engaged in the transporta-
tion of passengers or property wholly by railroad, partly
by railroad and partly by water when both are used, under
a common control, management, or arrangement, for a con-
tinuous passage or shipment from one State or Territory of
the United States, or of the District of Columbia to any
other State or Territory of the United States, or the
District of Columbia, or from any other place in the Unit-
ed States to any adjacent foreign country, or from any
place in the United States through a foreign country to
any other place in the United States, and also to the
transportation in like manner of property,shipped from
any place in the United States to a foreign country amd
carried from such place to a port of transshipment, or
shipped from a foreign country to any place in the United
States and carried to such place from a port of entry
either in the United States or an adjacent foreign country:
Provided, however, That the provisions of this act shall
not apply to the transportation of property or passengers
or to the receiving, delivering, storage, or handling of
property, wholly within one State, or not shipped to or
from a foreign country from or to any State or Territory a;
aforesaid.
Definition of the terms "railroad" and "transporta-
tion".
The term "railroad" as used in this act shall
include all bridges and ferries used or operated in con-
nection with any railroad and also all the road in use by
any corporation operating a railroad, whether owned or
operated under a contract, agreement, or lease ; and the
term "transportation" shall include all instrumentali-
ties of shipment or carriage.
Unjust and unreasonable charges prohibited.
All charges made for any service rendered or to
be rendered in the transportation of passengers or proper-
ty as aforesaid, or in connection therewith, or for the
receiving, delivering, storage, or handling of such
property, shall be reasonable and just ; and every un-
11
just and unreasonable charge for such carriage is prohib-
ited and declared to be unlawful.
Special rates, rebates, drawbacks, etc., prohibited.
Sec. 2. That if any common carrier subject to
the provisions of this act shall directly or indirectly
by any special rate, rebate, drawback, or other device,
charge, demand, or collect, or receive from any person or
persons a greater or less compensation for any service
rendered, or to be rendered, in the transportation of prop-
erty subject to the provisions of this act, than it char-
ges, demands, collects, or receives from any other per-
son or persons for doing for him or them a like and con-
temporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind
of traffic under substantially similar circumstances and
conditions, such common carrier shall be deemed guilty of
unjust discrimination which is hereby prohibited and de-
clared to be unlawful.
Undue or unreasonable preference, advantages, preju-
dices and disadvantages prohibited.
Sec. 3. That it shall be unlawful for any
common carrier subject to the provisions of this act to
make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or ad-
vantage to any particular person, company, firm, corpora-
tion or locality, or any particular description of traf-
fic, in any respect whatever, or to subject any particu-
lar person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or
any particular description of traffic, to any undue or
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect
whatever.
Discrimination between connecting lines prohibited.
Every common carrier subject to the provisions c
of this act shall, according to their respective powers,
afford all reasonable, proper and equal facilities for the
interchange of traffic between their respective lines, and
for receiving, forwarding, and delivering of passengers
and property to and from their several lines, and those
connecting therewith, and shall not discriminate in their
rates and charges between such connecting lines ; but this
shall not be construed as requiring any such common car-
rier to give the use of its tracks or terminal facilities
to any carrier engaged in like business.
Less charge for long haul than for including short
haul prohibited ; except when authorized by the Inter-
State Commerce Commission.
Sec. 4. That it shall be unlawful for any
common carrier subject to the provisions of this act to
charge or receive any greater compensation in the aggre-
gate for transportation of passengers or like kind of prop-
erty under substantially similar circumstances and condi-
tipns, for a shorter than for a longer distance over the
same line in the same direction, the shorter being in-
cluded within the longer distance ; but this shall not
13
be construed as authorizing any common carrier within the
terms of this act to charge and receive as great a compen-
sation for the shorter as for the longer distance ; Pro-
vided, however, That upon application to the Commission
appointed under the provisions of this act, such common
carrier may, in special casesafter investigation by the
Commission, be authorized to charge less for longer than
for shorter distances for the transportation of passengers
or property, and the Commission may from time to time pre-
scribe the extent to which any designated common carrier
may be relieved from the operation of this section of this
act.
Freight pools prohibited.
Sec. 5. That it shall be unlawful for any com-
mon carrier subject to the provisions of this act to
enter into any compact, agreement, or combination with
any other common carrier or carriers for the pooling of
freights of different and competing railroads, or to di-
vide between them the aggregate or net proceeds of the
earnings of such railroads, or any portion thereof ; and
in any case of an agreement for the pooling as aforesaid,
each day of its continuance shall be deemed a separate of-
fence.
For some time the constitutionality of the Law was
held seriously in question by railroads officials and also
by the advocates of the Laissez-faire school of econo-
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mists. They held that this was a law of man designed to
replace a natural law, and that Congress had no authority
or right to interfere in railroad management. They, to-
gether with many of less economic minds, forgot that Arti-
cle I, Sec. 8, Subdivision 3 of the Federal Constitution
gives Congress power to "Regulate commerce with foreign
nations, among the several States and with the Indian
Territories". And Congress, the Commission which the act
created, and the Supreme Court of the United States have
decided that the word "commerce" in this connection means
"intercourse of whatever character which crosses the
boundary line of any State". (Gibbon v.Ogden,9 Wheat.l;
Cooley's Principles of Constitutional Law,p.64.)
Rate being the principal object to which legislation
was directed, two classes of questions are involved inits
consideration. These two classes are wholly distinct in
their nature and widely different in their appropriate
treatment. One class relates to methods by which the
justice and reasonableness of a rate is to be determined,
the other to the measures by which the observance of that
rate is to be secured. It is one thing to fix the stand-
ard of compensation for a carrier's service, it is quite a
different thing to enforce the carrier's adherence to that
standard in its dealings with the public. (I.C.C.Reports,
1893,p.6.)
The special remedies provided by the Inter-State Com-
merce Act are cumulative and not exclusive of the general
remedies given by the Judiciary Act, conferring jurisdic-
tion of all suits and controversies arising under an
act of Congress, regardless of any diversity of citizen-
ship between the parties.(Little Rock & M.Ry.Co.v.East Tem
V. & G.Ry.Co.,47 Fed.,771.) In this connection it is
worthy of note that the Inter-State Commerce Commission
is not a court but an administrative body, exercising
powers which are quasi judicial, but its decisions are en-
titled to the highest respect in the Federal Courts.(I.C.C
v. Cincinnati. N.O.& T.P.Ry.Co. 64 Fed. 981.)
Congress may give the Federal Courts exclusive juris-
diction in such cases where the right of action arises
under and by force of their acts. In matters to which
this act applies it has opened to an aggrieved party but
two channels to justice,viz., the Inter-State Commerce
Commission and the Circuit and District Courts of the
United States. There is no third. The State Courts have
absolutely no jurisdiction in the matter.(Copp.v.Louis-
ville & N.Ry.Co.,9 So.(Ala.)441.)
CHAPTER III.
"PARTY RATE" TICKETS.
A mere glance at the causes of complaint formulated
by the Senate committee, and which are given at .length in
Chapter I, easily warrants the assertion that discrimina-
tions in one form or another gave rise to the Inter-State
Commerce Act. Therefore it is natural,and to be expected,
that the cases arising under the act have grown out of
discriminations in its various forms. But it is only the
first five sections that in any way deal with discrimina-
tions, therefore only those sections will be considered
here. For the purpose of a clearer consideration they
will be classified and discussed, in this and the succeed-
ing chapters, in the following order,viz.: "Party rate"
tickets, unjust discriminations, the long and short haul
clause, connecting lines, the pooling clause, and the ef-
fect upon contracts.
A "party rate" ticket is a ticket differing from the
ordinary ticket in that it is granted to a "party" of
passengers rather than to one, by which, such party en-
joys special advantages in the way of equal services for
a less compensation, or better accommodations for an equal
fare, or some other concession on the part of the trans-
portation company over and above what is offered or given
17
to the ordinary passenger, in consideration of the great-
er number of passengers carried or an increase of business
by virtue of a greater number of miles traveled.
The first case which arose involving this question
was in 1890. It seemed that the Baltimore & Ohio Ry.Co.
offered a 2/ rate to parties of ten or more passengers,
while single passengers were charged the regular rate of
3/ per mile. After a careful consideration of the case
the Court held that this was no violation of the act, on
the ground that it was in the interest of the public and
prevented the work of scalpers.(T.C.C. v. B.& O.Ry.Co.43
Fed.37.) In the following year a case of a similar
nature arose. An agent of the Chicago,St.Paul & Kansas
City Ry.Co. sold to one Petsch 5,000 "limited" tickets
from St.Paul to Chicago at $7.00 each. The tickets were
to be punched on the margin in order to indicate the day
on which they were limited. This, in fact, was not done.
The price of unlimited tickets was all.50 as filed with
the Inter-State Commerce Commission. The contention was
that there was a violation of Section 6 of the Commerce
Act. But it was held that there was not in fact a discrim
ination because unlimited tickets give the right to stop
over and to check baggage to intermediate points, while
in strictly limited tickets there must be a continuous
passage and completed before the expiration of the time
limited. And as in this case there was no time limited,
the tickets were good until used but no stop over could
be given without violating the Commerce Act.(U.S. v.Egan,
47 Fed.112.)
However, these two cases did not appear to settle the
question, for in 1892 a case arose on a petition from the
Inter-State Commerce Commission, which was prosecuted,
with a vigor almost approaching violence, until it was
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. The
opinion in the case is by Mr.Justice Brown and is both ex-
haustive and convincing. The decision of the Court
and some of the argumentwill be given in this and the
succeeding pages. The learned Justice in substance said
as follows: :The issue,by a railway company engaged in
inter-state commerce, of a "party rate" ticket for the trarm
portation of ten or more persons from a place situated
in one State or Territory to a place situated in another
State or Territory, at a rate less than that charged to a
single individual for a like transportation on a similar
trip does not thereby make "an unjust and unreasonable
charge" against such individual within the meaning of
Section 1 of the act ; nor make an "unjust discrimination"
against him within the meaning of Section 2 of that act ;
nor give "an undue or unreasonable preference or advantage'
to the purchasers of the "party rate" tickets within the
meaning of Section 3. The principal objects of the Inter-
State Commerce Act were to secure just and reasonable
19
charges for transportation ; to prohibit unjust discrimin-
ations in relation to like services under similar circum-
stances and conditions ; to prevent undue and unreasonable
preference to persons, corporations, or localities ; to in-
hibit greater compensation for the shorter than for the
longer distance over the same line ; and to abolish combi-
nations for the pooling of freights. It was not designed,
however, to prevent competition between different roads,
or to interfere with the customary arrangements made by
railway companies for reduced fares in consideration of
increased mileage, when such reduction did not cperate as
an unjust discrimination against other persons travelling
over the road. In other words, it was not intended to
ignore the principle that one can sell at wholesale cheap-
er than at retail. It is not all discriminations or
preferences that fall within the inhibition of the statute;
only such as are unjust or unreasonable. For instance,
it would be obviously unjust to charge A a greater sum
than B for a single trip from Washington to Pittsburg
but if A agrees not only to go but to return by the same
route, it is no injustice to B to permit him to do so for a
reduced fare, since the services are not alike, nor the
circumstances and conditions substantially similar, as re-
quired by Section 2 to make an unjust discrimination. In-
deed the possibility of just discriminations and reasonable
preferences is recognized by these sections, in declaring
20
what shall be deemed unjust. It is true, a charge may be
perfectly reasonable under Section 1, and yet may create
an unjust discrimination or an unreasonable preference
under Sections 2 and 3. As was said by Mr.Justice Black-
burn in the Great Western Railway Company v. Sutton(L.R.4
H.L. 226,239) : "When it is sought to show that the charge
is extortlonable as being contrary to statutable obliga-
tions to charge equally, it is immaterial whether the
charge is reasonable or not ; it is enough to show that
the Company carried for some other person or class of per-
sons at a lower charge during the period throughout which
the party complaining was charged more under the like
circumstances."
In order to constitute an unjust discrimination under
Section 2, the carrier must charge or receive directly
from one person a greater or less compensation than from
another, or must accomplish the same thing indirectly by
means of a special rate, rebate or other device ; but in
either case it must be for a "like and contemporaneous
service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic,
under substantially similar circumstances and conditions"
to bring the present case within the words of this sectior;
we must assume that the transportation of ten persons on a
single ticket is substantially identical with the transpo-
tation of one, and, in view of the universally accepted
fact that a man may buy, contract, or manufacture on a
21
large scale cheaper, proportionately, than upon a small
scale, is impossible.
In delivering the opinion in this important case
Mr.Justice Brown quoted from the opinion of Judge Jackson
in the court below, as follows : "To come within the in-
hibition of the said section, the differences must be made
under like conditions, that is, there must be contemporane-
ous service in the transportation of like kinds of traffic
under substantially the same circumstances and conditions.
In respect to passenger traffic, the positions of the re-
spective persons or classes, between whom differences in
charges are made, must be compared with each other, and
there must be found to exist substantial identity of
situation and of service, accompanied by irregularity or
partiality resulting in undue advantage to one, or undue
disadvantage to the other, in order to constitute unjust
discrimination. (I.C.C. v.B.& O.Ry.Co.,145 U.S.,263.)
CHAPTER IV.
UNJUST DISCRIMINATIONS.
The question as to what is unjust discrimination has
drawn the courts into the greatest perplexities. The dif-
ficulties arise out of the wording of the act itself.
It is clear that Congress did not intend to abolish all
discriminations, only such as were unjust, else it would
not have framed Section 3 so as to read:"It shall be un-
lawful x x x to give any undue or unreasonable preference
or advantage x x x." It is plainly seen from Sections
2 & 3 that Congress contemplated two kinds of unjust dis-
criminations; first, as to prices charged, and second, as
to facilities and accommodations furnished. It is a
criticism too harsh and entirely unwarranted to say that
Sections 2 & 3 are loosely constructed, and that Congress
intended to prohibit all discriminations.
Some of the difficulties into which the courts have
fallen may be solved by a study of the differences between
discriminations prohibited at common law and those pro-
hibited by the statute. At common law discriminations
which are unreasonable are such only as inure to the undue
advantage of one person or class of persons in consequence
of some injustice practiced upon another. The whole
question is,"Does the carrier charge the complaining
23
party a fair and reasonable compensation ?" If such is
fair and reasonableit is immaterial what advantage is
given the favored person or class of persons. So a car-
rier may charge one person or class of persons less than
fair compensation, and others cannot justly complain so
long as he carries on reasonable terms for them.(Mencho v.
Ward,27 Fed,529.) The difficulty with the common law
doctrine is that the test as to what is a reasonable chark
to the complaining party may, and is apt to, depend large-
ly upon what others are charged ; thius the common Jaw rule
would work a result similar to that produced by the
statute. That the common law is changed by the act to
regulate commerce is clearly shown in United States v.
Tozer (37 Fed.,635), where it is laid down that the dis-
crimination need not be confined to devices, or a special
rate, rebate, drawback, but is committed by directly
giving different rates to different persons. So a prima
facie case is made out under the statute by simply allegirg
a difference in rate for "a like and contemporaneous
service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic
under substantially similar circumstances and conditions."
What are "substantially similar circumstances and condi-
tions" will be discussed later in this chapter.
The cases of course deal with particular states of
facts and so the result of them can only be cumulative,
as tending to bring together the various act which, in
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the eye of the law, are just or unjust. So it was held
to be unlawful for a railway company to carry cotton out
of a general route and press it at its own expense for a
charge equal to the published through ratelespecially
where the same advantages were offered to the petitioner,
but who did not care to take advantage of them. (Cowan
v. Bond,39 Fed.,54) In United States v. Delaware,Lackawan-
na & Western Railway Company (40 Fed.lO1) the respondents
had contracts with two car companies for the use of cert-
ain cattle cars. Those of the Lackawanna Company could be
used for coal on a return trip, while those of the Ameri-
can Company could not. An agreement was entered into
whereby the respondents could carry horses only in other
than the cars of the Lackawanna Company. One Torris of-
fered cattle to be shipped in the cars of the American
Company which were refused. In an action against the Com-
pany for thus refusing the horses in these cars it was
held, that this was not an "unjust discrimination"in
favor of the transportation company. The court said
that "facilities" does not embrace car equipments for
transportation of freight over the carrier's own road.
In Inter-State Commerce Commission v.Texas & P.Ry.
Co.(52 Fed. 187) the question of "unjust discrimination"
was also raised. The defendant showed plainly that
unless they offered special rates to foreign goods they
would lose certain traffic entirely. They relied upon
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this as a ground for their failing to comply with the de-
cision of the Commission. In concluding the argument
the court said :"The Inter-State Commerce Act would be
emasculated in its remedial efficiency, if not practically
nullified, if a carrier can justify a discrimination in
rates merely upon the ground that unless such rate is
given, the traffic which would be obtained thereby would
go to a competing road. A shipper having a choice betweci
competing carriers would only have to refuse to send his
goods by one of them, unless given an exceptional rate,
to justify that one in making the discrimination in his
favor, on the grounds of the necessity of the situation".
The most recent case that has arisen in which this
point was involved is that of Little Rock & M.Ry.Co.,v.
St.Louis & S.W.Ry.Co. which was decided in September, 1894
and is reported in 36 Federal Reporter at page 775. The
complaint stated that the defendant road required payment
in advance of some patrons while this burden was not im-
posed upon others. The learned judge who delivered the
opinion in the case said in substance the following : The
common law right to require payment in advance of some cus-
tomers, and of extending credit to others has not been
taken away by the Inter-State Commerce Act, unless it is
taken away incidentally by the inhibition contained in
the third section of the act which declares that an inter-
state carrier shall not "subject any particular person,
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company, corporation or locality x x x to any undue or
unreasonable x x x disadvantage in any respect whatever".
The judge said, I quote from the opinion, "This prohibi-
tion is very broad, it is true, but it is material]y
qualified and restricted by the words 'undue and unreason-
able'. Such complained-of wrongs do not appear to have
existed when the act was passed, and it does not seem
that Congress contemplated any such situation. This being
so, the general words of the statute ought not to be given
a scope which will deprive the defendant company of an un-
doubted common law right which all other individuals and
corporations are still privileged to exercise and ordinari-
ly do exercise".
Nor is it an unjust discrimination for a railroad
company to make a special arrangement with a theatre
troupe to carry them through by a certain hour, upon which
the success of the performance depends. Neither is such
an undue or unreasonable preference.(Foster v.Cleveland.C.C
& St. L. Ry.Co., 56 Fed., 434.)
The difficulties in which the courts have been in-
volved in determining what are unjust discriminations
within the meaning of the act are forcibly brought out in
the masterly decision and arguments of the court in the
case of Tozer v.United States (52 Fed.917). In that
case it was held that where two connecting lines agree
on a joint through tariff, such joint tariff, or the
share of it which either takes, is not the standard by
which to determine whether either line violates Section 3
of the act forbidding "undue preference". What is undue
preference has caused the courts no slight amount of
trouble ; it is indefinite and uncertain in the extreme.
To punish criminally for it.s violation upon the verdict
of a jury as to whether they think a preference reason-
able or unreasonable would create quite as much uncertain-
ty as does a certain section in the Chinese Penal Code,
which reads as follows : "Whoever is guilty of improper
conduct, or of such as is contrary to the spirit of the
law, though not a breach of any specific part of it, shall
be punished at least forty blows, and where the improprie-
ty is of a serious nature, with eighty blows". There is
very little difference between such a statute and one
which would make it a criminal offence to charge more than
a reasonable rate".
The distinction is recognized through(Jut the law be-
tween discriminations and preferences which are just and
reasonable and those which are unjust and unreasonable,
according as they are made or given under similar or dis-
similar circumstances and conditions. Not all discrimina-
tions or preferences are forbidden or declared unlawful,
but only such as are unjust, undue, or unreasonable. In
each case, therefore, the question whether a discrimina-
tion is unjust, or a preference is undue or unreasonable,
either as to the common carrier, or the commerce it may
transport, involves a consideration of the circumstances
and conditions under which discrimination or preference
is made or given(Kentucky & I.Bridge Co.y. Louisville & N.
Ry.Co.,37 Fed. 567.) The courts have had no slight dif-
ficulty in determining what are"contemporaneous services"
and what are "substantially similar circumstances and con-
ditions." The determination as to what are "circumstances
and conditions substantially similar" is in each case a
question of fact for the jury upon a proper direction from
the court.(Osborne v.Chicago & N.W.Ry.Co.,48 Fed.49.)
Therefore little is to be found on this point in the repor
ed decisions of the appellate courts. But as to the ques-
tion what are "contemporaneous services" the problem in
each case resolves itself into a question of law for the
court. As yet few cases have arisen which have been de-
cided on this point. Where the question has been involv-
ed the cases have been those in which the complaint is
based upon a discrimination in services performed at times
different only by a few days. For instance, in the case of
United States v.Tozer (39 Fed.369), it was held that to
carry two barrels of sugar for one person on a given date
and to carry one barrel of sugar for another person be-
tween the same points, over the same route, two days later,
are "contemporaneous and like services" within the meaning
of Section 2 of the Inter-State Commerce Act. But of course
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if both services are for one and the same party, then no
action can be maintained under the statute.(United States v
Tozer, 39 Fed, 904.)
CHAPTER V.
LONG AND SHORT-HAUL CLAUSE.
The fourth section of the act contains the great dis-
criminating clause known as the "long and short-haul clause"
which provides that, "it shall be unlawful for any common
carrier subject to the provisions of the act to charge or
receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for the
transportation of persons or like kind of property, under
substantially similar circumstances and conditions, for a
shorter than for a longer distance over the same line, in
the same direction, the shorter being included within the
longer distance". From the passage of the act to regulat
commerce this provision has been subjected to violent and
persistent attacks. The practice of making low rates
upon traffic upon which competition exists, and of charg-
ing high rates to non-competing points, and also upon
strictly local traffic, was an abuse which had become so
common that the framers of the law were convinced of the
need of special protection to intermediate points. The
enactment of the fourth section was therefore deemed a pub-
lic necessity.
This rule, requiring carriers to establish aggregate
charges with reference to the distance commerce is carrie,
seems so just and desirable that the opposition created
by its enactment and application appears astonishing to
those who are unfamiliar with the rate-making methods whidh
prevailed prior to 1887 ; and when upon inspection of the
section it is seen that the rule is only applicable where
the transportation for longer and shorter distances is
conducted under circumstances and conditions which are
substantially similar, this determined antagonism seems
difficult to explain to persons well versed in the needs
and requirements of railroad operation.
The long and short-haul principle is nothing more
than an extension to places of the rate, and forbidding
unjust discrimination between persons. It is as necesaary
to the prevention of illegal preferences between locali-
ties as the second section is to the prevention of wrong-
ful favoritism as between persons. The fourth section,
or the long and short-haul provision, and the second, or
the unjust discrimination clause, stand in the statute as
definite and specific rules on either side of the general
and indefinite provision against undue preferences con-
tained in the third section. They are, on account of di-
rectly applying to particular transportation services,
essential to successful regulation, for their presence in
the statute prevents a large number of abuses which would
exist with impunity until separately condemned in actions
brought under the third section or the first section of
the statute. This is nothing more than an extension of tlB
old, but always applicable maxim, that "an ounce of pre-
vention is worth a pound of cure". The most active de-
nunciation of the fourth section comes from those whose
arguments amount to an assertion that carriers should have
the greatest latitude in establishing rates, and that suf-
ficient public protection is afforded in the correction
of wrongs which may be shown to exist by proceeding under
the law. They would have no legal barriers but they
caused the propriety of a legal cure.
But in spite of the satisfactory operation of the
clause in general, strong opposition to the principle con-
tinued to be manifest in different quarters, and this
eventually took the form of open defiance by asserting the
the competition of two or more railroads subject to law
is sufficient to warrant a lesser charge for the longer
haul. This was contrary to the construction of the sec-
tion as laid down by the Commissior and approved by the
courts. The Commission had held that the only railroad
competition which may justify carriers in fixing rates
contrary to the long and short-haul principle was in
"rare and peculiar cases", and instances of hardship to
circuitous lines entitled to engage in the traffic were
given. But this restricted pernmissior was distorted by a
great many carriers into a general license to make any
railroad competition an excuse for lower rates on longer
hauls, with the result of greatly impairing the efficient
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operation of the sectior and of entailing great hardship
upon competing carriers whose rates were still based upon
what the Commission had laid down as the proper meaning
of this provision. The necessity of putting a stop to
this abuse was plain, and the Commission in the Georgia
Cases declared that competition between carriers subject
to the law does not entitle either competitor to depart
from the rule of the fourth section, and that permission
to do so must first be sought from the Commission by an
applicatior for relief under the provisory clause of the
section. It should be clear to all interests that upon
such an application every carrier connected would be pro-
tected in its rights, and that any undue burdens shown
would be removed by a relieving order.(T.C.C.Reports,1893
pp.31-3.) But to render lawful a greater charge for
a shorter than for a longer haul under Section 4 of the
Inter-State Commerce Act, it is not necessary to first
obtain authority from the Commission. Such charge is
lawful if the circumstances and conditions are not in
fact "substantially similar", and the carrier may determim
the question for himself, subject to a liability for
violating the act, if upon investigation, the fact be
found against him.(I.C.C.v.A.T.& S.F.Ry.Co.50 Fed.,295.)
It is obvious that the authority and power conferred
upon the Commission by the proviso contained in Section 4
is limited to cases that fall within the enacting clause
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of that section, for its purpose manifestly is to enable
the Commission to relieve carriers from its operation in
cases where it deems such action proper. Such purpose
is also expressly declared in the concluding clause of
the proviso. And the power thus conferred is exclusive
and its exercise conclusive, and in all cases that fall
within the prohibition of the enacting clause of the sec-
tion to which the proviso is appended, that is to say, to
every case where the carrier charges or receives greater
compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of
passengers, or like kind of property, under substantially
similar circumstances and conditions, for a shorter than
for a longer distance. In all such cases a greater
charge for a shorter than for a longer haul is absolutely
prohibited, unless the commission, for good cause, see
fit to relieve a particular carrier from its operation.
But if the circumstances and conditions are not substan-
tially similar the prohibition imposed by the statute does
not apply at all. This question the court must determine
If it finds that the circumstances and conditions under
which the greater charge was made for the shorter than
for the longer haul in question were substantially similar,
the inquiry ends, and the order of the Commission must be
enforced ; for in such case it was the exclusive province
of the Commission to determine whether or not there exist-
ed such other circumstances as would make it proper to
authorize the defendant companies to charge and receive
greater compensation for the shorter than for the longer
haul. But if the case shows that the greater charge for
the shorter than for the longer haul was made under sub-
stantial]y dissimilar circumstances and conditions, (there
being no claim that the compensation charged or received
for the shorter haul was otherwise unjust or unreasonable)
then and in that event, it is manifest that the case does
not fall within the prohibition of the Iter-State Commerce
Act at all. (I.C.C. v.Atchison, T.& S.F.Ry.Co.,50Fed.295.)
So it is held that it matters not so far as the fourth
section is concerned whether the rate complained of is one
which the defendant has made alone or that it is one which
he has made working in conjunction with other roads.(Junod
et al v.Chicago & N.W.Ry.Co.,47 Fed,290.)
In Inter-State Commerce Commission v. Detroit,G.H &
M.Ry.Co. (57 Fed.1005) a bill in equity was filed in the
Circuit Court by the Inter-State Commerce Commission to re-
strain the defendant railway company from violating sec-
tion four of the act. From the evidence it appeared that
the defendant road delivered freight free by their own
carts to customers in Grand Rapids consigned from the far
East, while such was not accorded consignees living and
doing business in Ionia, Michigan. With a very strong
dissenting opinion by Severens,J., it was held that such
granting of free cartage was an unjust discrimination
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against the consignees in Ionia and prohibited by Section 4
An interesting case was decided in October, 1892 by
the Circuit Court of Appeals involving the question of
long and short haul and joint tariff rates. The facts are
substantially these : The defendant in error, plaintiff be
low, owns and operates a railway from Missouri Valley, a
town on the western border of Iowa~to Chicago,Illionois.
Scranton is a town in Iowa on the line of this road eighty-
eight miles east of Missouri Valley and therefore so much
nearer Chicago. The Fremont, Elkhorn & Missouri Valley
Railway Company owns a railroad running east and west
through Nebraska, and connecting with the defendant's
road at Missouri Valley. Blair, Nebraska,is a point on
that road thirteen miles west of Missouri Valley. While
the Fremont,Elkhorn & Missouri Valley Railway Company is
an independant corporation, a majority of its stock be-
longs to the defendant company, and thus the defendant com-
pany controls its operation.
During the month of January, 1888, there was in force
a local tariff of rates charged on defendant's road. This
local tariff was duly published at Scranton. In accordane
with it, the rate from Scranton to Chicago on corn was 18
per hundred weight. All shippers shipping simply to
Chicago paid that rate. The plaintiff, among others,
made sundry shipments and was charged and paid such sum.
There was, so far as appears, absolute uniformity of rate
as to all such loacl shipments. At the same time the
tariff on corn shipped through from Balir, Nebraska, to
New York City was 38-1/2V; to Boston, Philadelphia and
Baltimore it seems that it was slightly above and below
this figure. This through rate was made up in this way :
By agreement between the defendant and Eastern companies,
corn was shipped through to New York from Turner and Ro-
chelle, two small stations on the defendant's road, one
thirty and the other seventy miles west of Chicago, for
27-1/2/, 3-1/2j of which went to the defendant and the
balance to the Eastern companies ; and by agreement be-
tween the defendant and the Fremonty Elkhorn & Missouri
Valley Railway Company the rate from Blair to Turner and
Rochelle, on corn shipped to New York Boston, Philadel-
phia or Baltimore was ll. In other words, by these agree-
ments of the several companies a through rate was fixed
on corn shipped from Blair to New York and other Eastern
cities ; and of that through rate the defendant company,
for carrying the whole line of its road, less the local
tariff of 18/ charged from Scranton to Chicago. This
joint tariff was not published at Scranton and no notice
of it was given to or possessed by the plaintiff until
February 24, and until that time he made no application
for shipment beyond Chicago. Therefore he shipped to Bos-
ton and received the benefit of the through rate.
In writing the opinion in this case, Mr.Justice Brews
made the following remarks :
First : "That Congress has not attempted to require
that tariffson all roads be uniform ; nor has it attempted
to place a limit in figures beyond which no company may go
in its charges. The laws of business and competition have,
as yet, been deemed sufficient restraints in that directim
The Rock Island is, between Chicago and the Missouri
River, a parallel and competing road with the defendant
company ; yet there is nothing in the Commerce Act which
compels either company to charge for through or local trars-
portation the same as its competitor. Either company may
reduce its rates as far as it pleases below what is reason-
able and a fair compensation for the service without
violating the act ; and such reduction compels no change
by its competitor or any other company. This is obvious
from the reading of the act."
Second : "That where two companies owning connecting
lines of mad unite in a joint through tariff, they form
for the connected roads practically a new and independent
line. Neither company is bound to adjust its own local
tariff to suit the other, nor compellable to make a joint
tariff with it. It may insist upon charging its local
rates for all transportation over its line. If, thereforg
the two companies by agreement make a joint tariff over
their lines, or any part of their lines, such joint tariff
is not the basis by which the reasonableness of the local
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tariff of either line is determined. To illustrate : On
the defendant's road the distance from Turner to Chicago
is thirty miles ; on the Lake Shore line, from Chicago to
Cleveland,it is two or three hundred miles. The defendant
company may charge 15 X for transporting grain the thirty
miles from Turner to Chicago, provided it be in fact only
a reasonable charge for the service, although the Lake
Shore Company charges no more for transporting grain from
Chicago to Cleveland ; the fact that the rate on each line
is 15/ for the distance named will not prevent the two
Companies from making a joint tariff for grain shipped fron
Turner to Cleveland of 12/, less than the local tariff of
either. That we may not be misunderstood, we do not mean
to intimate that the two companies with a joint line, can
make a tariff from Turner to Cleveland higher than from
Turner to Buffalo, or any other intermediate point between
Cleveland and Buffalo ; for when the two companies by their
joint tariff make a new and independent line, that new and
independent line may become subject to the long and short-
haul clause. But what we mean to decide is that although
tariff on a joint line is not the standard by which the
separate line of either company is to be measured or
condemned." (Chicago & N.W.Ry.Co. v.Osborne,52 Fed.912
followed in United States v.Mellen et al, 53 Fed.229.)
This last proposition may not appear as obvious as th
former, and yet a careful study of the act leaves no doubt
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as to its correctness. In the first section a definition
of the term "railroad" is given, which in addition to
bridges and ferries includes,"also all the road in use by
any corporation operating a railroad, whether owned or
operated under a contract, agreement, or lease." A joint
tariff does not bind road to road in the same sense that
the two are used or operated by either corporation. There
is neither unity of ownership nor unity of operation, but
only a singleness of charge, and a continuity of transpor-
tation over connecting roads. Neither is there any
mandate to connecting companies to surrender any control
over their own roads,nor to unite in a joint tariff.
"Reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the inter-
change of traffic" are commanded by the third section, but
with the proviso : "This shall not be construed as requir-
ing any such common carrier to give the use of its tracks
or terminal facilities to any other carrier engaged in
like business". No power existed at common law, and none
is given by the act to court or commission, to compel con-
necting companies to contract with each other, to abandon
full control of their separate roads, or to unite in
joint tariffs.(Express Cases,117 U.S.,l ; Kentucky & I.
Bridge Co. v.Louisville & N.Ry.Co.,37 Fed.,567 ; Little
Rock & M. Ry.Co. v.St.LouisI.M. & S.Ry.Co.,41 Fed,559.)
Further, it is a fact that at the time of the passage of
this act joint through tariffs were well known ; as well
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as the fact that they were generally less than the sum of
the local tariffs, and not distributed between the severa
companies making them according to the mere matter of
mileage. In this act joint tariffs are recognized ; and
if Congress had intended to make the local tariff subordi-
nate to or measured by the joint tariff, its language would
have been clear and specific.
It is worthy of note also that in the debates which
attended the passage of the bill through both houses, and
while the matter was under discussion, it was again and
again said by those participating in the debates that the
line formed under the joint tariff of connecting companies
was one separate and independent from that of either of
the connecting companies ; and also worthy of note that in
the actual administration of affairs by the Inter-State
Commerce Commission the same thing has been repeatedly
recognized.(Chicago & N.W.Ry.Co. v.Ozborne, 52 Fed,912.)
CHAPTER VI.
CONNECTING LINES.
It may be seen by a glance at the cases referred to
in the preceding chapters that the matter of connecting
lines has occasioned not a little litigation and has in
some cases involved the courts into the greatest difficul-
tics. The questiors of greatest interest in this connec-
tion have arisen upon the construction of "equal facili-
ties" and "connecting lines" as found in the latter half
of Section 3 of the Inter-State Commerce Act.
The Commission in its annual report to Congress for
the year 1892 dwells at some length upon the important
case of the Oregon Short Line v. The Northern Pacific Rail-
way Company (51 Fed.465) which was decided by the Circuit
Court of Appeals on June 15, 1892. The gist of the de-
cision is that the third section -- the undue preference
and facilities clause-- of the Inter-State Commerce Act,
does not require a railroad company to receive freight in
the cars in which it is tendered by a connecting line and
transported in such cars, paying car mileage therefor,
when it has cars of its own available, and the freight
would not be injured by the transfer. That there was
abundant opportunity for argument upon this question is
clearly seen from the strong dissenting opinion by Dealy J.
from which the following is a quotation : "To exchange
freight in bulk by railroads is certainly 'a reasonable
and proper facility'. It is a general custom, except in
some special instances like this, where the carrier diso-
beys the injunction of law for the purpose of injuring a
competing line in its own interest. To exchange freight
by the car load is a 'reasonable and proper facility for
the interchange of traffic between these lines', and it is
such a facility to enable them to receive and forward pas-
sengers and property to and from their respective lines aid
those connecting with them. On the other hand to require
the plaintiff to unload its cars with freight destined for
points on the (Puget) Sound, at Portland, and there reload
the same on the defendant's cars as freight originating
at the 2atter point, is to afford no facilities for such
purpose at all. Such a construction of the statute ren-
ders it altogether nugatory and leaves the matter as at
common law. The section goes beyond the common law, and
therefore it must impose a duty beyond that of merely re-
ceiving frieght from the plaintiff when unloaded from its
cars."
The difficulty appears to centre around the word
"line". In the same case from which the above is a quo-
tation a further doctrine is laid down, which although
only dictum, is very strong, viz., that the joint line
formed by the two roads is wholly independent of the two
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lines represented by the respective roads, that the total
joint rate is not the standard by which the reasonableness
of rates over the individual lines can properly be measured,
and, therefore, that the total joint rate over the two
roads not being over "the same line", might for anything
in Section 4 of the act, not only be as low, but even low-
cr, than the local rate of either. Further, the meaning cC
the word "line" in the fourth section, as construed by the
Commission in its decision in the Central Vermont Cases
(1 I.C.C. Rep.,158), and generally accepted by carriers
throughout the country, is that "a physical line is
meant, not a business arrangement, and one piece of a road
may be part of many lines". That this is the construc-
tion intended by the framers of the act may be seen from
the following quotation from the speech of Senator Aldrich
made in the Senate while the bill was under consideration;
"The word 'line' as used in the fourth section, can have
but one meaning, and that is the physical structure, the
track over which property is transported. To transform
this mass of rails, ties, and sidings, over which freight
is hauled into a living, responsible being, which can ma1e
contracts and be subject to penalties, is beyond the
power of human effort". (Debates on Inter-State Commerce,
49th Congress, Second Session; I.C.C. Reps.1892,pp.30-3.)
In 1892 a case arose involving the same clause of
Section 3, but in a slightly different way. The petition
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presented by the line affected averred that the petitioner
was deprived by the respondent of equal facilities with a
competing connecting line for the interchange of traffic,
a discrimination in rates, the withdrawal of a joint
through tariff, and a threat to close a through route via
petitioner's line. In that case it was held that a charge,
not only of discrimination in rates, but also of failure
to provide equal facilities for the interchange of traffic
was properly brought to the cognizance of the Commission,
and that upon the showing of proper proof an injunction
would issue to prevent such abuse.(N.Y.& N.Ry.Co. v.N.Y.&N
E.Ry.Co.,50 Fed. ,867.)
But where two connecting carriers united in putting
in force a joint through tariff between given points it
has beendecided that, under sections 3 & 4 of the act,
such joint tariff is not the standard by which local tar-
iffs on either road is to be determined and the fact that
a railway company charged a local shipper more for trans-
porting property between two points on its road than it
charged for the same service when the property was received
from a connecting road, and was carried under a joint tar-
iff established by the connecting carriers, does not estab-
lish the charge of undue preference or discrimination.
(Parsons v. Chicago & N.W.Ry.Co. 63 Fed, 903 ; Little
Rock & W.Ry.Co. v.East Tenn. V. & G.Ry.Co.,47 Fed.,771.)
The provisions of the Inter-State Commerce Law for-
bidding discrimrinations against any locality or descrip-
tion of traffic is for the protection of the locality or
traffic itself, and cannot be invoked by a carrier as
against a connecting line which discriminates in the mat-
ter of requiring prepayment of freight and car mileage, be-
tween goods which come from different sections of the
country over the line of the connecting carrier. The
provision requiring carriers to afford all reasonable,
proper and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic,
and forbidding discrimination between connecting lines
is not violated by receiving and forwarding, without pre-
payment of freight or car mileage, cars of other compan-
ies containing goods coming from one locality, and refus-
ing to do so unless prepayment is made, when goods are
from a different locality.(Oregon Short Line & W.N.Ry.Co.
v.Northern Pacific Ry.Co.,6l Fed., 158.) The case of
Little Rock & M. Ry.Co. v.St.Louis & S.W.Ry.Co.(63 Fed.775)
is a simi'Lar case. It has been discussed in another con-
nection.
It is a fundamental principle underlying the discus-
sion of this matter as a whole that the Commission and the
courts in general deal with these railroad problems only e
they grow out of railway constructions actually in exist-
ence. In other words, they deal only with things as they
find them and will not order new constructions.(Kentucky
& I.Bridge Co. v.Louisville & N.Ry.Co.,37 Fed.,567.)
Neither can a carrier be forced to allow others to use
its tracks. (Supra) Nor is a transportation company,
operating a railway and a line of steamboats connecting
at the company's wharf, required by Section 3 to permit
the boats of competing lines to land at such wharf. (Ilwar
co Ry.& Nav.Co. v. Oregon Short Line & W.N.Ry.Co.,57 Fed,
673.)
Still further it is held that a rialroad company is
not required by the Inter-State Commerce Act, Section 3 cl
2, to furnish to competing connecting carriers equal facil-
ities for the interchange of traffic, which involves
the use of its tracks by such carriers ; and it may still
permit such use by one carrier to the entire exclusion of
the others. Nor is a competing road which permits through
billing and travelling with one forwarding road obliged
to do likewise with another forwarding road, although the
latter possesses all the necessary tracks and terminal
facilities ; and it may still insist on carrying all
freight offered by such road in its own cars, and to that
end require reloading and rebilling at local rates. (Lit-
tle Rock & P. Ry.Co. v. St. Louis, I.M.& S. Ry.Co.59 Fed.,
400.)
CHAPTER VII.
THE POOLING CLAUSE.
Section 5, or the "Pooling Clause" of the Inter-State
Commerce Act reads as follows "That it shall be unlaw-
ful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of
this act,to enter into any contract,agreement, or combina-
tion with any other common carriers for the pooling of
freights of different and competing railroads, or to divide
between them the aggregate or net proceeds of the earnings
of such railroads,or any portion thereof, and in case of
any agreement for the pooling of freights, as aforesaid,
each day of its continuance shall be deemed a separate
offence".
In investigating this topic the writer has been con-
fronted at the very outset with the fact that this clause
has met with almost universal condemnation. It has been
attacked by some in a most violent way, while from others
it has received harsh but judicial criticism. On account
of this peculiar condition, the discussion in this chapter
will be based almost entirely upon general principles and
economic reasoning, and will deal in a very limited way, if
in fact at all, with Federal decisions, which to such a
great extent formed the bulk of the preceding chapters.
In the first place the "Pooling Clause" does not seem
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to harmonize with those that precede it, and has it seems
no proper relation to them. It could not have been for-
mulated by those who were imbued with the spirit of the
law, or fully comprehended its aim and object. As a mat-
ter of fact it was a result of the compromise between the
two houses of Congress and was bitterly opposed by the
Senate. It was accepted and incorporated into the act
rather than endanger its passage. There is nothing in te
act preceding Section 5 which indicates an intention on
the part of the framers of the bill to deprive railroad
companies of the right to make their own contracts in
their own way, subject to the restrictions of law. The
ample provisions made to prevent unreasonable and unjust
charges would, if fully enforced, be sufficient to prevent
any unjust rate, whether made by the companies by agree-
ments among themselves or by the individual acts of indi-
vidual companies. The law broad and catholic in its gen-
eral character and based upon equitable principles, intencb
no wrong to the carrier and permits him to do no wrong to
his patrons. It is the natural right of the individual
to make such contracts as may suit his interests or his
inclination, and while they are in conformity with law no
one may restrain him. The same right belongs to the
artificial person or corporation to the full extent of the
powers acquired by charter, and, except for the statute,
his right to make these contracts, within such limits,
50
would be undoubted. If this proposition be correct, the
question presents itself with great force, why should them
corporations be restrained from making such agreements as
to rates and the division of business at competitive
points as to them may seem desirable, provided always the
rates are reasonable, just,and not discriminating. The
law requires these conditions in the previous sections and
has later on formed a tribunal to determine what is reaso-
able, what is just, and what is discriminative.
The question then resolves itself into this ; why wa
this section put into the law ? The only reason for it
which appears upon the surface is that those who control
the business interests of the competitive points seek to
formulate such conditions that there will at all times be
such struggles for business between the carriers that, by
rebate or secret rate, they may expect to force some ad-
vantage to themselves. They have succeeded in working up
the popular prejudices against corporations and have
created the public sentiment that approved this section.
It is believed that if its effect were well understood
public sentiment would be quite as decidedly against the
section : and "also that the section would be repealed,
not modified, altered or amended for the reason that the
freedom to make contracts with themselves and others should
not be abridged unless clearly against public interest, ard
that interest so general in its character as to include
all points".(6 R.R. Commissioners' Reports,p.9-10.)
The above quotation is taken from Mr.Peter A. Dey's report
to the Railroad Commissioners presented in May, 1894.
That he is too severe in his dennnciation of the section
and that his suggested remedies are too radical, there
cannot be the slightest doubt. In fact, he admits in his
opening remarks that he is going to exaggerate, and going
to take extreme positions.
He says further, that it is believed, in considering
the relation of railway companies to the public, that no
special legal protection is necessary ; that it is fully
prepared to look to its own interests, and if allowed to
exercise the ordinary rights and powers that are necessary
for the defence of property, it is fully able to care for
itself. The difficulty with Section 5 is that it deprives
the railroads of the only means they have at competitive
points for relief from the effects of unregulated competi-
tion. Mr.Nimmo says that "agreements as to the apportion-
ment of competitive traffic tend to promote the flow of
commerce in its natural channels, x x x . The ordinary aid
and just administration of the railroad transportation
interests of the country ought to be allowed to protect
themselves against the effects of large shippers and
vicious commercial trusts and other combinations to induce
unjust discriminating rates, in their own favor." The
law was not designed to obstruct or lay additional bur-
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dens upon, but to regulate inter-state commerce, and if
it is carried out in its spirit,would, it is believed, re-
sult in benefit as great to the corporations regulated as
to the public.
It would seem that Section 5 was enacted in the be-
lief that if the carriers were able to destroy each other,
the public would permanently gain by their contests. This
is believed to be a mistake, and that one of the most
difficult tasks is to prevent these contests from injuring
the communities depending upon them for transportation.
It is observed that a large majority of railway managers
who have expressed themselves on this matter are of opin-
ion that pooling is dangerous and should not be allowed
except by sanction of the Commission. The Commission is
not supposed to be made up of experts in this branch of
railroading, and there appears to be no objection to givirg
the companies the broadest latitude, and if in the carry-
ing out of the pooling agreements the law is violated, or
the individual or locality be discriminated against, there
is ample power lodged in the board without this section
to right the wrong.(6 P.R.Commissioners' Reports,pp.lO-13.)
T!r. M.M.Kirkman, in his Railroad Rates and Governmental
Control, bitterly opposes the "Pooling Clause". He claims
that pooling is in accord with good business usage. It
prevents foolish extravagance and materially lessens the
cost of operation.
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From the foregoing considerations a fair conclusion
is as follows : The pooling clause seems to be out of
place. It was opposed by the Senate when the bill first
came up and was only accepted by that body as a sort of
compromise between the two houses of Congress. It is a
deplorable fact that many of our most important laws have
been the result of patched up bills at the end of a stormy
session as a sort of compromise. There appears to be
nothing bad or wrong in Judicious pooling. It should
have been put in the act as being assisted, managed, and
controlled by governmental authority. As eminent a
jurist as the Honorable Thomas T% Cooley, first Chairman
of the Commission, is of this opinion and his report in
favor of it may be found in Vol.T1 of the Inter-State Com-
merce Reports.
CHAPTER VII ].
EFFEVCT OF THE ACT UPON CONTRACTS.
Although the field which it has been the province
of this paper to investigate has been one fruitful for
inquiry and by no means exhausted, the writer feels that
time will not permit of further research. Therefore this
work will conclude with a brief mention of the effect
of the act upon contractual relations, followed by some
general comments by way of conclusion.
The question early arose, to what contracts does the
act refer ? From a careful consideration of the cases,
the answer can only be that it refers to all contracts
which contravene its provisions, whether made before or
after its passage. In Southern W.Co. v.St.Louis Bridge
Co.(38 T'-o.App. ), it was held that the act to regulate
commerce related back so as to make contracts, discriminat-
ing in their nature, invalid though made before its pas-
sage. A similar case is that of Bullard v. Northern Pac.Ry.
Co. reported in 25 Pacific Reporter at page 120. It was
there decided, after a very careful argument, that a con-
tract entered into prior to the passage of the act, for
the carriage of freight by a railroad company at a rate
contrary to the provisions of that law, cannot be enforced
after its passage, and the shippers cannot recover any re-
bates stipulated for in such contracts. The decision
rested on the ground that the act to regulate commerce is
a general law and contracts are always liable to be more
or less affected by general laws, even when in no way re-
ferred to.
A contract which contravenes the provisions,or any
of them, of the act to regulate commerce, is a contract
in violation of the express provisions of law and is
therefore utterly void as between the immediate parties
to it. It is therefore impossible for a shipper to en-
force against a railroad company a contract giving a pref-
erential rate.(Hawley v.Coal Co.,48 Kan.593 ; Chicago
R.I. & P.Ry.Co. v.Hubbell,38 Pac., 266.)
The Inter-State Commerce Act has been sharply criti-
cised by some of our ablest economic thinkers. Mr.Aldrace
F. Walker in his article in Vol.XT of the Forum, speaks of
the act in this way. He says : "The essence of the Inter-
State Commerce Law is that it forbids unjust discrimina-
tions under pains and penalties. In other words the result
was forbidden while the cause was left in full operation.
The symptoms of a disease had been submitted to a diagno-
sis and a treatment for the malady prescribed, while the
cause was allowed to remain in full force." P r.Walker
claims that it was not perceived that competition might be
regulated in its excesses without in any way affecting it
altogether. He is a believer in the fundamental principles
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of the act, and of the propriety of Federal intervention,
but he does not believe that the best means have been
taken to root out the evils of the railroad system.
There appears to be a general tendency to criticise
the Commission, and much uncalled for censure has been
heaped upon it. But it rhust be remembered t1lat Commis-
sions cannot see or reach all. The field of the Commis-
sioners is a vast one. To those who may suppose that no
good reason can be given why all disparities and inequali-
ties of rates and methods may'not be discovered and cor-
rected as fast as they exist by a tribunal created and ap-
pointed by Congress for that purpose, it may not have oc-
curred that the railroad mileage of the United States, if
it could be transposed into that form, would make six
parallel lines of railroad around the earth. Over this
vast network of public highways, in extent without paral-
lel, in diversity equal to its extent, and constantly
increasing, the commerce of the United States is trans-
ported. The competition of carriers and localities con-
tend for it with ceaseless energy. Its transportation
is environed by different circumstances and conditions at
many points in the vast confines of the Republic. That
out of this condition of affairs, inequalities and dis-
parities of rates must occasionally arise, even where the
carriers who make them are actuated by the best of mo-
tives ; and that objectionable methods may in-like manner
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be adopted by them occasionally,-- is one of the inevitable
features of such a system.

